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Letter from the Justices of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District,
to the California Senate and Assembly
Judiciary Committees Regarding Trial
Court Unification (SCA 3)*
To:

Hon. William Lockyer, Chairman, Senate Judiciary
Committee, Hon. Phillip Isenberg, Chairman, Assembly
Judiciary Committee, and the members thereof.

From:

Hon. Robert K. Puglia, Presiding Justice and Hon. Coleman
A. Blease, Hon. Keith F. Sparks, Hon. Richard M. Sims III,
Hon. Rodney Davis, Hon. Arthur G. Scotland, and Hon.
George W. Nicholson, Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeal, Third Appellate District

Date:

October 8, 1993

The following comments represent the views of the above-named
members of the Third District Court of Appeal regarding SCA 3 and SCA
3 as it is proposed to be amended in Trial Court Unification: Proposed
Constitutional Amendments and Commentary of the Presiding Judges and
Court Administrators Standing Advisory Committees, dated September 11,
1993, chaired by the Hon. Roger Warren. (hereinafter, Warren Committee
Report.) The changes proposed by the Warren Committee Report that are
of concern are attached as Appendix A. A proposal to rectify the
jurisdictional problems present in these proposals is attached as Appendix
B.
There are two areas of immediate concern to us. On the one hand, SCA
3 in its present form causes jurisdictional problems, e.g., it would send all
of the appeals from matters within the jurisdiction of the municipal and
justice courts to the courts of appeal. On the other hand, the Warren
Committee proposal would abolish provisions which safeguard the

*

The Pacific Law Journal is published in conformity with a modified version of the HARVARD

BLUE BOOK (15th ed. 1991). In order to replicate the original letter written by the Justices, the following
publication does not comply with this form of citation authority.-Managing Department, the Pacific Law
Journal.
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constitutional jurisdiction of the courts of appeal and vest plenary powers
over their internal administration in the Judicial Council.
More specifically, the Warren Committee proposal would repeal the
constitutionaljurisdiction of the courts of appeal over appeals from causes
over which the superior courts presently have original jurisdiction (i.e., the
most significant cases) and would abolish thereby the constitutional right
of litigants to appeal such cases to the courts of appeal. It would vest the
power to determine where an appeal should be taken in the Judicial
Council, subject to approval by the Supreme Court. (Warren Committee
Report, p. 34; revision of art. 6, § 11.)
The Warren Committee proposal would also repeal the Legislature's
authority to provide for the officers and employees of the trial courts, and
would vest that authority, as well as the power to regulate the employees
of the Courts of Appeal, in the Judicial Council and the Chief Justice.
(Warren Committee Report; pp. 29-30; revision of art. 6, § 6.)
We are opposed to these proposals. We would support alternative
amendments to SCA 3 to cure the jurisdictional problems (see below for
the divisions proposal).
We begin by examining the amendments which SCA 3 and the Warren
Committee proposal would make to the existing constitutional law. We
then ask whether the radical changes in constitutional jurisdiction are
justified by the goal of administrative efficiency.
I
The Constitutional Right of Appeal
A. The Existing Law
The California Constitution presently divides causes of action into
(essentially) two classes and assigns the more significant to the superior
court and the less significant class to the municipal and justice courts. The
jurisdictionalseparation of these courts into superior and inferior tribunals
together with this assignment of causes has significant consequences.
Article 6, section 11 of the Constitution vests "appellate jurisdiction" in the
courts of appeal over all causes over which the superior court has original
jurisdiction.' It creates thereby a constitutional right of appeal in such
cases. (See, e.g., In re Sutter-Butte By-Pass Assessment (1923) 190 Cal.

I.
Section I I currently provides that "[w]ith that exception [death penalty cases] courts of appeal have
appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have original jurisdiction and in other causes prescribed by statute."
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532.) This entails resolution of the appeal by a court of broad geographic
jurisdiction by means of the traditional appellate review process, including
written decisions with reasons stated. (Cal. Const. art. 6, §14.) Causes
assigned to the municipal and justice courts are not appealable unless made
so by statute and if so may be resolved without a written opinion by a
local, county appellate department. (Art. 6, § 11.)2
B. SCA 3 As Presently Constituted
If the trial courts are unified, the present means of separating trial
courts into superior and inferior tribunals will vanish and, unless replaced
by a similar jurisdictional arrangement, so will the constitutional right of
appeal which is dependent upon that jurisdictional arrangement. If, as
currently provided in SCA 3, a new district court is given jurisdiction over
all causes, including those previously assigned to the municipal and justice
courts, all causes, however trivial, would be accorded full appellate review
in the courts of appeal, significantly raising their workload? If a single
trial court is created and vested with all of the powers presently given the
multiple trial courts, including appellate powers, there will be no superior
tribunal to hear appeals in causes formerly within the jurisdiction of the
municipal and justice courts and no superior tribunal to issue writs
concerning such causes to an inferior court tribunal. It is conceptually
anomalous for a court to hear an appeal from itself or to direct a writ to
itself.
If the problem is sought to be resolved by delegating the authority to
determine whether and where an appeal should be taken, the appellate
jurisdiction of the courts of appeal could be dramatically curtailed, e.g., by
sending appeals to the appellate department of the new unified trial court
without the costly necessity of written opinions. This presents the appellate
jurisdiction problem of SCA 3.

2.
Section II currently provides that "Superior courts have appellate jurisdiction in causes prescribed
by statute that arise in municipal and justice courts ...."
3.
SCA 3, as amended in Asseembly July 16, 1993, would amend section 10 of art. 6 to provide that:
"[d]istrict courts have original jurisdiction in all causes." It would also amend section II to provide that, with
the exception of death penalty cases, "courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when district courts have
original jurisdiction .....
Read together, the courts of appeal would be given appellate jurisdiction over all causes
including those presently within the jurisdiction of the municipal and justice courts.
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C. The Warren Committee Proposal
The Warren Committee would create a single unified trial court with
no jurisdictionaldivisions. It proposes to "solve" the "appellate jurisdiction
problem" of SCA 3 by revising section 11 to provide that all causes shall
be classified into two categories, categories One and Two, and that the
courts of appeal shall have appellate jurisdiction over Category One causes
and the district court appellate jurisdiction over Category Two causes. No
criteria are given for delineating these classes of causes. They do not mark
the jurisdictional boundaries of the existing trial courts. So far as their
constitutional status is concerned, they are mere labels. Rather, the Warren
Committee proposal would vest the authority to define the "classes of
causes" within each category, and hence the authority to determine where
an appeal may be taken or a writ issued, in the Judicial Council, which
may act by rule with the approval of the Supreme Court. The Warren
Committee Report argues that "[w]hether appeals should be heard by a
court of appeal or the appellate department is largely a matter of judicial
policy and administration." (Report, p. 38.) Thus, what had been a matter
of constitutional right, to appeal to the court of appeal in the significant
causes within the original jurisdiction of the superior court, is reduced to
a matter of administrative efficiency. The claim is made that a
constitutional right of appeal has been preserved because, unlike the
present section 11, 5 appeal is made a matter of right in Category Two
causes to the district court. But that blinks the reality of the distinction
4.

Section II would be amended as follows:

(a) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when judgment of death has been pronounced. With
that exception courts of appeal and district courts have appellate jurisdiction when superior-eourts
h.vae erigiral jur-idictic n and in other causes prezcibed by statute as provided in this section. (b) All
causes in the district courts are within Category One or Category Two. Assignment of classes of
causes to either of these categoriesshall be made pursuant to rules adopted by the judicialcouncil
which shall become effective when approved by a majority of the Suprenze Court. Any causes not
assigned to Category Two shall be deemued to be assigned to Category One. (c) Courts of appeal
have appellate jurisdiction in Category One causes, cases in which one or more causes within
Category One is joined in the same proceeding with one or tnore causes within Category Two, and
in other causes prescribed by statute. (d) &uperie District courts have appellate jurisdiction in
Category Two causes presmbed by -tat-ut that arise in mnunicipal and justieeoufts within their
eounies territorialjurisdictions.
5.
Section 11 of article 6 currently provides that "[s]uperior courts have appellate jurisdiction in causes
prescribed by statute that arise in municipal and justice courts" thus reposing discretion in the Legislature to
decide whether an appeal should be accorded in such a cause. (Emphasis added.) The Warren Committee would
repeal the italicized language, while substituting "district" for "superior" court, thus making "appeal" to the
district a matter of constitutional right. We have elsewhere commented that it makes no sense to talk of
appealing a case to oneself, as the Warren Committee would provide.
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between appellate review in the courts of appeal and appellate review in
the district court.
It must be emphasized that the present constitutional right of appeal is
a function of the different jurisdictionsof the existing tiers of trial courts.
The Legislature has no power to preclude an appeal in a cause within the
original jurisdiction of the superior courts. It has no power simply to
determine where an appeal should be taken. This provides the only
constitutional safeguard against the temptation to manipulate appellate
jurisdiction as attempted in In re Sutter-Butte By-Pass Assessment. The
proposed classification approach simply surrenders this safeguard.
The Warren Committee proposal for solving the appellate jurisdiction
problem also carries with it a change in civil jury size. Section 16 of art.
I is proposed to be amended to provide that "[i]n Category One civil
causes the jury shall consist of 12 persons, unless otherwise agreed upon,"
but not so in Category Two cases. (Warren Committee Report p. 8;
proposed revision of art. 1, § 16.) It is explained, that "[a]s of the effective
date of these amendments, all causes within the jurisdiction of the . . .
superior courts will be declared Category One causes," thus, "this
amendment will result in no change to the constitutionally provided size
of the civil jury." (Ibid.) However, that is misleading since, as a
constitutionalmatter, under section 11, the Judicial Council and Supreme
Court would decide the content of the categories. What is meant, therefore,
is that it is proposed that those bodies make that determination as a matter
of judicial policy. That, of course, is subject to the vagaries of time and
circumstance. The only value of a constitutional safeguard is that it is not
subject to administrative or statutory control.
For these reasons we oppose the Warren Committee proposal. It would
abolish the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts of appeal and the
ancillary right to appeal the significant causes now within the original
jurisdiction of the superior courts. Regarding appeals that presently would
be taken from causes within the jurisdiction of the municipal and justice
courts and writs directed to such courts, it affords no relief for the
conceptual headache of a court with jurisdiction over itself.
The Warren Committee Report also gives us independent causes for
concern. Among other things, the Report proposes to vest plenary powers
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over court administration in the Judicial Council and Chief Justice.6 This
redistribution of powers presently confided in the appellate and trial courts
is not required to achieve trial court unification. (Report pp. 29-30.) The
Warren Committee also would repeal the existing constitutional provisions
which state that the Legislature shall "provide for the officers and
employees" of each trial court, leaving (under the amendments to section
6) the Judicial Council and the Chief Justice as the sole repositors of this
authority. (Report, p. 25.) It is explained that the purpose of this deletion
is that "good management principles require that courts have authority to
provide for their own employees within the limits of resources provided
to the courts." (Emphasis added.) This confuses the "courts" with the
Judicial Council and the Chief Justice. As a consequence the courts would
be wholly dependent upon them for whatever administrative authority they
would be permitted to exercise over their own affairs. We think that sound
principles of court management are better served by the present
decentralized system in which courts at each level have authority over their
own personnel.
Currently, for example, both the appellate and trial courts are given
authority by legislation over the selection of their staffs. (See e.g., Govt.
Code sections 69141, 19825 [courts of appeal]; 69890 ff. [superior
courts].) This authority would be shifted to the Judicial Council and Chief
Justice, acting as the "chief executive officer for the courts," under the
proposals sanctioned by the Report.
There are further changes that are not necessary to trial court
unification. The proposal needlessly forces policy choices in procedural
law under the gun of transition. It will make necessary the revision of all
of the statutes which turn on the present jurisdictional differences of the
trial courts. As related, it poses significant difficulties in extraordinary writ
jurisdiction regarding causes presently assigned to the "inferior tribunals,"
municipal and justice courts.
For the reasons set out above we oppose SCA 3 in its current form and
as it is proposed to be amended by the Warren Committee Report.

6.

The proposal is as follows:

The Judicial Council is the policy-making body for the courts. To improve the administration of
justice the council shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make
recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration,
adopt rules for practice and procedure; not inconsistent with statute, and perform other functions
prescribed by statute. The ChiefJustice shall be the chief executive officer for the courts and shall
implement the rudes promulgated by the Judicial Council
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II
The Divisions Proposal
Our court has proposed the establishment of two divisions of the
unified trial court, which would incorporate the bifurcated subject matter
jurisdictions of the existing trial courts and their procedural regimes (the
divisions proposal) in a single administrative unit, called the district court,
thus preserving the present constitutional arrangements while permitting
whatever efficiencies can be gained from a single class of judges and a
single administration. This would preserve the existing constitutional right
of appeal in the significant cases now within the jurisdiction of the
superior court. It would simplify the transition to a unified court by
enabling continued use of the present statutory scheme concerning
procedural matters. The divisions proposal would similarly allow
extraordinary writ statutes to continue in use by granting to the higher
division writ jurisdiction over matters in the lower division as an "inferior
tribunal." (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) If this approach is not
adopted, a Pandora's box of policy choices is opened.
However the divisions proposal has not met with favor by the Warren
Committee. (Report p. 24) It objects that it would result in a "somewhat
awkward and confused structure." This seems, at best, to be an aesthetic
objection entitled to no weight unless a satisfactory alternate solution is
supplied. The Report also objects that the creation of departments is a
matter that should be "dealt with" by statute or rules of court and that
there is no "principled reason" for addressing this basis of division in the
Constitution. Obviously, the principled reason for the distinction is to
continue the present constitutional arrangements concerning appellate
jurisdiction while obtaining the benefits of administrative unification.
It has also been asserted that the divisions proposal perpetuates a
perceived stigma of "inferior" status judges. This concern about
"inferiority" is unreasonable since the proposal contemplates actual
equality of trial judges, with the same freedom and presumably rotation of
assignments that would exist under any other version of the trial court
unification proposal. In our view there are no "inferior" judges, there are
only "inferior tribunals," a nonderogatory statutory usage that merely
reflects the institutional arrangements necessary for appellate and writ
review of questions of law.
It is deep conceptual confusion to think that this "damned spot" of
"inferiority" can be washed out of any system that affords appellate and
writ review. Such review requires a separate reviewing entity that is
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"superior" in the sense that it can, in limited circumstances, overturn or
reverse the action of the inferior tribunal. If there is no separation of
entities, then the system of review is no more than a rehearing and cannot
be considered appellate review. Indeed, as noted, without some
constitutional recognition of jurisdictional separation, such as that afforded
by the divisions proposal, one is left with the Warren Committee Report's
proposed solecism of a "fully unified" trial and appellate and writ review
court, i.e., an inferior/superior district court with appellate and writ
jurisdiction over itself.
III
The Goal of Administrative Efficiency
Is Unification More Efficient Than Coordination?
Since the Warren Committee proposal would make radical changes in
the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts of appeal and affect the internal
administration of the courts, it is proper to inquire whether such changes
are justified by the claimed fiscal advantage of administrative efficiency
which is the announced goal to be achieved by trial court unification.
We are not told why a constitutional amendment is necessary to
achieve administrative efficiency. The courts are presently implementing
the trial court coordination plan, authored by Assemblyman Isenberg,
which has the same purpose. (Gov. Code section 68112.) Indeed, the
Warren Committee Report offers the experience of the Sacramento courts
under the statutory coordination plan as support for the claim that savings
would be made by the constitutional amendment. (Report p. 22.) The
merits of the statutory plan are currently under study by the Judicial
Council. (See 1993 Annual Report, Judicial Council of California, pp. 1819.)
It is not self-evident that a constitutional amendment is necessary to
achieve the administrative savings advanced as the reason for SCA 3.

7.

The Report states:

Based on the experience of those counties which have coordinated the provision of judicial services
most fully, these particular increases [in salaries and benefits occasioned by unification 9 (see fn. 2)]
will be offset by the costs avoided through reducing the need for additional judgeships. Counties that
have already consolidated their superior and municipal court benches report significantly more
efficient use of available judicial resources which directly translates into a reduced need to create
more judgeships.
(Warren Committee Report, p. 22.)
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The appropriate question to be answered is whether SCA 3 could
save money over and above that saved by the statutory trial court
coordination plan.8

Appendix A.
[Editor's Note: As originally presented to the Senate and Assembly
Judiciary Committees, Appendix A contained Part 3 of the Warren
Committee Report. The Warren Committee Report is reproduced in full in
this issue at page 230. Part 3 begins at page 248.]

Appendix B.
The Divisions Proposal
California Constitution
Article I
Declaration of Rights
Section 16, paragraph 2. In civil causes the jury shall consist of 12
persons or a lesser number agreed on by the parties in open court. In civil
causes in municipal or justice cour division two of the district court the
Legislature may provide that the jury shall consist of eight persons or a
lesser number agreed on by the parties in open court.

8.
The question is especially pertinent in view of the facts that SCA 3 would increase the salaries and
benefits of all municipal court judges by $10,000 per year, would transmute justice court judges from part time
to full time judges at an effective increase of some 18 judicial positions, and would likely increase the retirement
benefits of all retired municipal and justice court judges because the terms of the existing municipal and justice
court judges, which are used to measure the benefits of retired judges, would continue into their terms as district
court judges. (Warren Committee Report, p. 7.)
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Article VI
Judicial
Section 1. The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme
Court, courts of appeal, u
cours, municipal courts, and justice
eeuts and district courts. All courts are courts of record.
Section 4. In each county ..
asupeor
urt of one or moroe.
judges. The Legislature shall preseribe the number of judges and provide
for the offlcers and employe of each superior coui. If the gove ing
body of each affected county concurs, the Legislature may proevide t-hat one
or More judges serv'e more than on sprcourt. The county clerk is the
ex officio clerk of the supo cor in t-hPe ounty.
The Legislature shall divide the State into district courts, each
consisting of one or more entire counties. The Legislature shallprovide for
the organization, territorialjurisdiction, number and compensation of
judges, and the number, qualifications, and compensation of the officers
and employees of the district courts. The district courts shall have two
divisions.
Section 5, concerning the municipal and justice courts, is repealed.
Section 10. The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, their judges, and
sue~division one of the district courts and thei- judges have original
jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. Those courts also have original
jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of
mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The jurisdiction of division one of
the district courts shall extend to matters arising in division two of the
district courts.
Supeief Division one of the district courts have has original
jurisdiction in all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts
division two of the district courts. On the effective date of this amendment
all causes within the originaljurisdictionof the superiorcourts are within
the originaljurisdiction of division one of the district courts and all causes
within the jurisdiction of the municipal and justice courts are within the
jurisdiction of division two of the district courts.
The court may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony
and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper
determination of the cause.
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Section 11. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when
judgment of death has been pronounced. With that exception courts of
appeal have appellate jurisdiction when .upeeiorcouAs have division one
of the district courts has original jurisdiction and in other causes
prescribed by statute.
Superior coeu-ts have Division one of the district courts has appellate
jurisdiction in causes prescribed by statute that arise in ..uiieipal a1-a
jusice e.e.
division two of the district courts in their oun
The Legislature may permit appellate courts to take evidence and make
findings of fact when jury trial is waived or is not a matter of right.
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